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Abstract
Purpose – This study investigates factors contributing to residential mortgage loans default by utilizing a
unique dataset of borrowers’ default data from one of the pioneer lending institutions inMalaysia that provides
home financing to the public. Studies on mortgage loan default have been extensively examined, but limited
studies utilize the individual borrower’s data, as financial institutions generally hesitant to reveal their
customers’ data due to confidentiality issue.
Design/methodology/approach –This study uses logistic regression model to analyze 47,158 housing loan
borrowers’ data for the year 2016.
Findings – The findings suggest that male borrowers, Malay and other type of ethnicity, guarantor
availability, loan original balance, loan tenure, loan interest rate and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio are the
significant factors that influence mortgage loans default in Malaysia.
Research limitations/implications –Future studiesmay expand the sample by employing data from other
types of financial institutions that would give greater insights as findings might vary due to differences in
objectives, functions and regulations. In addition, the findings are subjected to the censoring bias where future
studies could perform the survival analysis to control for censoring bias and re-validating the findings of the
present study.
Practical implications –The findings provide valuable insights for lending institutions and the government
to formulate housing loan policy in Malaysia.
Originality/value – To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study in the context of emerging
economies that uses financial institution’s internal data to investigate factors of mortgage loan default.
Keywords Mortgage loan default, Housing loan Malaysia, Loan default factors, Micro-level
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The subprimemortgage crisis in 2007 has revealed that an increase in the delinquency rate of
mortgage loans is due to the deterioration in the loan quality and poor loan performance
(Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011). A deterioration in bank loan quality could weaken a
bank’s net worth as too many impaired loans in its financial statements may threaten its
solvency (Sathye et al., 2003). This, in turn, may prevent banks from granting new loans that
hinder economic growth and, in bad times, cuts in bank lending activitymight trigger a credit
crunch. Studying the determinants of residential mortgage loan default is important as
residential loans generally make up a substantial amount of total loan portfolio. The non-
repayment will affect the bank’s cash flow and income and eventually will have a direct
impact on the shareholders’ wealth. The worst-case scenario, it could end up triggering a
financial debacle for banks and financial institutions.
In relation to this, empirical studies onmortgage default conclude that the general causing
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macroeconomics factors (see Jones and Simons, 2015 for extensive review on mortgage
default literature; Tajaddini and Gholipour, 2017; Foote andWillen, 2018; Gerardi et al., 2018).
The existing academic studies have generally been examined from the macro-level
perspective using publicly available data or focusing on advanced economies.
This study extends existing research on mortgage loan default by examining default
factors from the micro-level perspective, by utilizing a unique dataset of borrowers’ default
data extracting from one of the lending institutions inMalaysia that provides home financing
to the public. Research examining micro-level data specifically using borrowers’ default data
are relatively limited, as financial institutions generally reluctant to reveal their customers’
data due to Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA).
Additionally, examining micro-level data provides advantage as borrowers are regarded
as heterogeneous units (Ritsila and Tervo, 2002). Thus, the present study would be able to
explore individual’s characteristics and determine their pure effects on mortgage default and
get further insights into the relationship between loan default and factors triggering default.
As suggested by Foote and Willen (2018), research on mortgage default still lacking in the
aspect of borrower’s personal data that can help to identify other default triggers. Moreover,
Geishecker (2008) emphasizes that micro-level data can address problems such as
aggregation and potential endogeneity bias. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) also
suggest that loan and borrower characteristics factors are very important in explaining the
cross-section of loan performance.
Malaysia offers a unique perspective to be examined as this emerging economy was
reported as having high household debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2019, reaching
82.7% from around 60% in 2008 [1]. For comparison, its neighboring countries, Thailand and
Singapore recorded lower household debt to GDP, which are 78.7 and 65% in 2019,
respectively. In relation to this, residential loans continue to be the largest contributor to
Malaysian household debt, followed by personal financing and loans for the purchase of
securities. Euromonitor International (2014) indicates thatmortgage default rates inMalaysia
were the second highest in the Asia and Pacific Region after the Philippine, while The Edge
Markets on 27 February 2017 reported that bankruptcy cases in Malaysia resulting from
housing loan defaults were the second highest after car loan defaults for years 2010, 2011
and 2013.
Thus, the present study is expected to shed some light into factors of residential mortgage
loan default in Malaysia by analyzing 47,158 housing loan borrowers’ data for the year 2016.
The findings indicate that two borrowers’ characteristic factors, gender and ethnicity, have
significantly influenced mortgage default in Malaysia. This implies that loan defaults are
higher amongmale borrowers compared to female borrowers, whileMalay and other types of
ethnicity have higher loan default compared to the other major ethnic groups inMalaysia. As
for loan characteristic factors, guarantor availability, loan original balance, loan tenure, loan
interest rate and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio are the significant factors that influence mortgage
loans default inMalaysia. This indicates that loan without guarantor will have higher chance
of default compared to loanwith guarantor. Moreover, the larger the loan original balance, the
longer the loan tenure, the higher the interest rate, and the higher the LTV; the higher the
probability of default would be.
The findings of this study have implications for the housing finance policy in Malaysia. It
is suggested that a simple test on the basic moneymanagement skills can be executed during
the loan evaluation process as a way to reduce the probability of mortgage loan default.
Moreover, since women aremore responsible in their loan repayment, Malaysian lendersmay
create a new mortgage loan product specifically for female borrowers. Lenders should also
request for guarantor if the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio is considerably high. In addition,
lower interest rate can be charged to the low-income borrowers so that they can service the
loan. To further reduce the probability of default, the loan tenure can be shortened from 35 to
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30 years. Finally, the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio should be capped at 70% for the
borrowers to purchase their second home to minimize loan default.
This study contributes to loan default literature in two ways. First, it utilizes a unique
dataset of borrowers’ data that gives greater insight into factors of mortgage default. Second,
it contributes to the loan default literature in the context of an emerging market economy
especially Malaysia as high household debts remains an issue in the country, with residential
property loans are the key driver of debt growth.
2. Malaysia housing finance market
Mortgage originators in Malaysia can be divided into three categories namely private sector,
public sector and secondary mortgage corporation. Private sector plays an essential role in
housing development inMalaysia where commercial banks (conventional and Islamic banks)
are themost important originators of housing loans inMalaysia. Other types of private sector
include development financial institutions (DFIs) and others (insurance companies,
co-operatives and developers). Prior to the 1970s, the bulk of housing loans was provided
by the building societies, inwhich theywere established as part of the government’s initiative
to ensure the availability of funds for the housing sector and to promote home ownership,
particularly of low- and medium-cost houses. However nowadays, the role is taken over by
the commercial banks.
In 2018, the total value of financial institutions’ exposure to the domestic property market
reached RM901.3 billion (USD216.9 billion). According to the Central Bank of Malaysia,
household impairments continue to be driven by residential property loans, where the growth
of impaired loans for residential properties has increased from 3.4% in 2017 to 7% in 2019. In
addition, the ratio of residential loan approval to loan application showed a decreasing trend
from 50.1% in 2011 to 42.5% in 2019 due to the rising house price. Affordability remains an
issue in the Malaysian residential property market due to a pronounced and prolonged
mismatch between demand and supply of residential property.
Among the noticeable characteristics of housing loans in Malaysia are the maximum loan
tenure is 35 years and the maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio can reach up to 90%. In
addition, the loan structure can be in the form of conventional or Islamic, based on borrowers’
preference. The Malaysian government policy is to encourage house ownership among its
citizen, besides enhancing accessibility to housing finance supply. This can be shown
through the introduction of housing schemes to provide adequate, affordable and quality
houses for Malaysians in various income levels, such as Housing Credit Guarantee Scheme,
My First Home Scheme, Youth Housing Scheme andHousing Special End Financing Scheme.
3. Literature review
Studies on mortgage loan default can be traced back since late 1960s in the United States.
Earlier studies by Von Furstenberg (1969), Vandell (1978) and Campbell and Dietrich (1983)
suggest that loan-to-value (LTV) ratio at the time of origination, borrowers’ personal
characteristics and borrowers’ income are among the important factors in determining
residential mortgage default. Since then, a great number of studies have examined factors of
mortgage default and in reviewing literature on residential mortgage default, Jones and
Sirmans (2015) highlight that there are four primary determinants of default: (1) loan
characteristics, trigger events and transaction costs, (2) borrower characteristics, (3) local
housing market and macroeconomic conditions and (4) legal structures of the default-
foreclosure process.
Loan characteristic factors are factors related to loan attributes such as initial LTV





amount of initial loan (Yang et al., 1998; Hakim and Haddad, 1999; Kelly, 2008; Soyer and
Xu, 2010 and Quercia et al., 2012), mortgage age (Campbell and Dietrich, 1983; Quercia and
Stegman, 1992; Springer andWaller, 1993; LaCour-Little, 2004; Ghent and Kudlyak, 2011),
negative equity (Deng et al., 2000; Linn and Lyons, 2019) and call option value (LaCour-
Little, 2004; Quercia et al., 2012). Trigger events are defined as loss of employment (Quercia
and Stegman, 1992; Deng et al., 1996, 2000; Capozza et al., 1997; Elmer and Seelig, 1999; Elul
et al., 2010; Quercia et al., 2012; Linn and Lyons, 2019) and divorce (Capozza et al., 1997;
Deng et al., 2000).
Borrower characteristics factors are factors related to borrower attributes such as
payment-to-income ratio (Stansell andMillar, 1976; Vandell, 1978; Springer andWaller, 1993;
Yang et al., 1998; LaCour-Little and Malpezzi, 2003; Bajari et al., 2008; Kelly, 2008 and Archer
and Smith, 2013), borrower income (Yang et al., 1998; Hakim and Haddad, 1999; Jones, 1993;
LaCour-Little and Malpezzi, 2003; Feldman and Gross, 2005; Quercia et al., 2012; Linn and
Lyons, 2019) and other borrower characteristics such as age, job position and number of
dependents (Jones, 1993). Local housing market and macroeconomic factors that might
contribute to mortgage loan default as reported in the existing studies are house price
volatility (Capozza et al., 1997; Yang et al., 1998), interest rate spread (Springer and Waller,
1993; Capozza et al., 1997) and interest rate volatility (Quigley and Van Order, 1995).
Nevertheless, research on other borrower characteristic factors such as ethnicity has
received less attention in the existing studies. As highlighted by Burton (1996), ethnicity
and cultural differences should be fully integrated when examining consumer financial
behavior. Malaysia is a multi-ethnic [2] and multi-cultural country and it is presumed that
racial and cultural differences might influence the financial behavior of households.
Existing studies on race and loan default typically address issues in the United States,
particularly the comparison between Whites and Blacks in repaying housing loans. For
example, Anderson and VanderHoff (1999) report that Black households have higher
marginal default rates in the United States, controlling for differences in borrower and
property characteristics. In addition, Martin and Hill (2000) document that minority loan
default rates are higher than comparable white default rates in the United States. The
relationship between major ethnic groups in Malaysia and mortgage loan default has
hardly been rigorously studied, and existing empirical evidence is limited. Accordingly,
this study attempts to investigate whether ethnicity plays a role in mortgage loan default
among Malaysians.
On the other piece, a recent study by Owusu-Manu et al. (2019) highlight that females are
more likely to default on credit than their male counterparts in Ghana. In relation to this,
women’s participation in the labor force in Malaysia has increased from 45.7% in 2008 to
56.1% in 2019. This might shape the behavior of consumer in relation to demand for financial
products and services as financial behavior of men and women differs significantly (Walczak
and Pienkowska-Kamieniecka, 2018). In China, Lin et al. (2011) conclude that the default
probability of male borrowers is significantly higher than that of female borrowers for
mortgage loans. In this regard, research examining the relationship between gender and
mortgage loan default in Malaysia is relatively limited. Accordingly, it is vital to explore
whether gender influences mortgage loan default in Malaysia.
As for loan characteristic factors, there are relatively limited studies examine other loan-
specific attributes such as guarantor availability, loan tenure and loan interest rate and see
their influence on mortgage default particularly in Malaysia. In bank lending, guarantor acts
as a back-up for borrower, meaning that the guarantor will honor a part or the totality of the
claim in case of loan default (Godlewski andWeill, 2008). Loan tenure is the time given for the
borrower to repay the loan and in Malaysia, housing loan tenure can reach up to 35 years;
raising the possibility of unexpected events thatmay increase the probability of default. Loan
interest rate is the interest rate charged on individual loan and in practice, bank has the
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discretion to charge lower interest rate to borrowers with a good credit rating. Thus, the
present study investigates whether those additional three loan characteristic factors will
influence mortgage loan default in Malaysia.
Former empirical literature onmortgage loan default inMalaysia is relatively scarce. Most
studies on Malaysian housing have focused on housing affordability (see, e.g. Olanrewaju
and Wong, 2020; Leng, 2020; Yap and Ng, 2018; Zainon et al., 2017; Ling and Almeida, 2016;
Bujang et al., 2010; Hashim, 2010). Some others examining the housing price (See Latif et al.,
2020; Wong et al., 2019; Kok et al., 2018; Reen and Razali, 2016; Pillaiyan, 2015; Osmadi et al.,
2015; Ibrahim andLaw, 2014; Lean and Smyth, 2013; Hui, 2010; Chin et al., 2004). The question
of factors triggering mortgage loan default remains under-explored in the literature. Hence,
this study is the first in Malaysia examining mortgage default factors utilizing a micro-level
data. The use of household-level data will allow the present study to perform a detailed
analysis and get further insights into the relationship between loan default and factors
triggering default in Malaysia.
4. Methodology
4.1 Data
The micro-level data was obtained from the lending institution based on the items on loan
application form for individuals. A total of five meetings were conducted with the lending
institution to ensure that the data obtained was clean and fulfill the requirements of this
study. However, the data obtained was subject to institution’s online data availability. For
example, the variable for education level was not available since it is not in the institution’s
online database.
A total of 47,158 loan accounts of individual borrowers, spanning years 2003–2016 were
obtained which was retrieved by the lending institution on 31 October 2016. The data
includes the account with full disbursement from 2004 to 2014 (except 15 accounts which are
on years 2015 and 2016). Out of 47,158 loan accounts data, a total of 5,186 loan accounts was
default. The data obtained is cross-section with the date of loan’s first disbursement and the
status of default (as at 31 October 2016) is provided.
4.2 Variable description
The dependent variable in this study is mortgage loan default (Pi), which equals 1 for
defaulted loans and otherwise equals 0. Following Babii et al. (2019), the default status is
defined as the loan installment in arrears for three or more than three months. The
explanatory variables that representing borrower characteristics are age (AGE), gender
(GENDER), ethnicity (MALAY, CHINESE, INDIAN, OTHER), marital status (MARSTAT)
and types of occupation (OCCGOVT, OCCSS, OCCMGMT, OCCEXEC, OCCNEXEC,
OCCSELFEMP, OCCUNEMP).
AGE is the age of the borrower at the year of loan disbursement (as at 31 October 2016).
Psychological study by Deakin et al. (2004) suggests that the risk-taking behavior decreases
with age, while Kuang et al. (2019) document that older borrowers are more responsive to an
increase in the interest rate than younger borrowers; implying the low risk-taking behavior
among older borrowers. Jones (1993) suggests that the older borrowers (higher age) have the
lower the probability of default. Thus, this study hypothesizes that AGEwill have a negative
association with the mortgage loan default.
GENDER is a dummy variable measured by 1 for male borrowers, 0 for female borrowers.
Lin et al. (2011) suggest that the default probability of male borrowers is significantly higher
than that of female borrowers for mortgage loans in China. Mokhtar et al. (2012) also find that





Malaysia. Another study by D’espallier et al. (2011) who utilize a global dataset of 350
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 70 countries also find the similar finding, women perform
better than men in loan repayment. Accordingly, it is expected that GENDER will have a
positive relationship with the mortgage loan default.
As for ethnicity, each of the ethnic variable is assigned with the dummy variable. There
are four types of ethnicity based on the data obtained: Malay, Chinese, Indian and Other.
Malay race is represented by dummy MALAY (1 for Malay, 0 otherwise), Chinese race is
represented by CHINESE (1 for Chinese, 0 otherwise) and acts as a comparison group, Indian
race is proxied by INDIAN (1 for Indian, 0 otherwise) and other types of ethnicity are proxied
by OTHER (1 for other type of ethnicity, 0 otherwise). In general, Chinese in Malaysia are
wealthier and have more access to sources of funds if any unexpected financial need arises
because they usually control and conquer the economic and business sectors in Malaysia
(Thillainathan and Cheong, 2016). Accordingly, this study hypothesizes that Chinese ethnic
will be less likely to default compared with other ethnics in Malaysia.
Marital status (MARSTAT) is a dummy variable for the personal status of the borrower
(1 for married borrower and 0 otherwise). According to Kuang et al. (2019), married borrowers
are more risk averse while Love (2010) suggests that wealth of married couple increases due
to combined assets. Thus, this study predicts that married borrowers will be less likely to
default compared with other category of personal status.
Based on the data obtained from the lender, type of occupation is divided into seven
categories: government (OCCGOVT), semi-skilled/skilled (OCCSS), management (OCCMGMT),
executive (OCCEXEC), non-executive (OCCNEXEC), self-employed (OCCSELFEMP) and
unemployed/economically inactive (OCCUNEMP). Similar to ethnicity, each of the type of
occupation variable is assigned with the dummy variable (refer Table 1 for complete
measurement). Jones (1993) and Lin et al. (2011) suggest that job position has a positive
relationshipwithmortgage default. This implies that the higher the borrower’s job position, the
higher the default probability would be. However, this study hypothesizes that unemployed/
economically inactive groupwill havehigher probability of default comparedwith others due to
unstable source of income to pay the housing loan.
The lender’s data contains a variety of loan characteristic factors such as payment-to-
income ratio (PTI), loan age (LOANAGE), guarantor availability (GUARANTOR), loan
original balance (ORIBAL), loan tenure (LOANTEN), loan interest rate (INTRATE) and loan-
to-value ratio at origination (LTV).
PTI stands for payment-to-income ratio or equated monthly installment (EMI) to income
ratio, the ratio of monthly installment to borrower’s income. PTI is regarded as one of the
important variables contributing to residential mortgage default, as confirmed by earlier
studies such as Stansell and Millar (1976) and Vandell (1978) and later studies such as Yang
et al. (1998), LaCour-Little and Malpezzi (2003), Kelly (2008) and Archer and Smith (2013).
They hold the belief that the higher the PTI ratio, the greater the risk of default would be as
borrower’s payment obligation relative to his disposable income will be larger. Accordingly,
this study expects that the PTI will have a positive relationship with the mortgage loan
default in Malaysia.
Mortgage age or loan age (LOANAGE) is the number of days between the loan’s first
disbursement date and the time the data is collected (31 Oct 2016). Generally, previous studies
find that there is a nonlinear relationship between mortgage age and probability of default
(Campbell and Dietrich, 1983; Quercia and Stegman, 1992; Hendershott and Schultz, 1993;
Springer and Waller, 1993), where the default usually happens in the early years of the
mortgage, descend upon in the middle years and steadily declines in the later years. Some
studies on the other hand report that there is a positive relationship betweenmortgage age and
default (LaCour-Little, 2004; Ghent andKudlyak, 2011). Based on the earlier findings, this study
predicts that LOANAGE will have a non-linear relationship with the mortgage loan default.
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Variable Definition Expected sign
Default Loan default; 1 for defaulted loans, 0 otherwise
Following Babii et al. (2019), the default status is defined as the loan
instalment in arrears for three or more than three months
Borrower characteristics
AGE Age of the borrower at the year of loan disbursement þ/
GENDER 1 for male borrower, 0 for female borrower þ/
MALAY 1 for Malay, 0 otherwise þ/
CHINESE 1 for Chinese, 0 otherwise Comparison
group
INDIAN 1 for Indian, 0 otherwise þ/
OTHER 1 for other type of ethnicity, 0 otherwise þ/
MARSTAT 1 for married borrower, 0 otherwise þ/
OCCGOVT 1 for government type of occupation, 0 otherwise Comparison
group
OCCSS 1 for semi-skilled/skilled type of occupation, 0 otherwise þ/
OCCMGMT 1 for management type of occupation, 0 otherwise þ/
OCCEXEC 1 for executive type of occupation, 0 Otherwise þ/
OCCNEXEC 1 for non-executive type of occupation, 0 otherwise þ/
OCCSELFEMP 1 for self-employed type of occupation, 0 otherwise þ/
OCCUNEMP 1 for unemployed/economically inactive, 0 otherwise þ/
Loan characteristics
PTI Payment to income ratio (or equated monthly installment (EMI) to income
ratio); the ratio of monthly installment to borrower’s income
þ
LOANAGE The age of loan is the number of days between the loan’s first
disbursement date and the time the data is collected (31 October 2016)
þ/
GUARANTOR 1 for loan with guarantor, 0 otherwise –
ORIBAL The original balance of loan amount approved by the lender at the time of
application
þ
LOANTEN Loan tenure at the time of application þ
INTRATE Loan interest rate charged by the lender at the time of application þ




D2010 Dummy variable to measure the tightening of lending policy guideline
introduced by the Central Bank of Malaysia beginning from 2010 to
promote a sound and sustainable household sector
–
1 if the loan’s first disbursement occurs on 2010–2016, and 0 otherwise
DCRISIS Dummy variable to measure crisis years in 2008 and 2009 þ
1 if the loan’s first disbursement occurs on 2008 and 2009, and 0 otherwise
DLOCATION Dummy variable to measure borrower’s location
There are 11 states in the sample; Kedah, Johor, Penang, Sarawak, Perak,
Terengganu, Kelantan, Sabah, Pahang, Melaka and Negeri Sembilan
1 for Kedah, 0 otherwise
1 for Johor, 0 otherwise
1 for Penang, 0 otherwise
1 for Sarawak, 0 otherwise
1 for Perak, 0 otherwise
1 for Terengganu, 0 otherwise
1 for Kelantan, 0 otherwise
1 for Sabah, 0 otherwise
1 for Pahang, 0 otherwise
1 for Melaka, 0 otherwise
1 for Negeri Sembilan, 0 otherwise







Guarantor availability (GUARANTOR) is a dummy variable that indicates 1 for loan with
guarantor and 0 otherwise. Guarantor acts as a back-up for borrower, meaning that if a
borrower failed to repay, the guarantor will honor a part or the totality of the claim in case of
loan default (Godlewski and Weill, 2008). Therefore, the presence of a guarantor mitigates
agency problems resulting from adverse selection, in line with the better information owned
by the bank on the borrower. Therefore, it is expected that loan with guarantor will be less
default compared to loanwithout guarantor as the borrowerwill bemore responsible to repay
the loan.
ORIBAL is the original balance of loan amount approved by the lender at the time of
application. Generally, the larger the loan amount, the higher the probability of default
would be as it will be more burdensome for borrowers to repay the loan. In relation to this,
empirical studies by Kelly (2008), Soyer and Xu (2010), and Quercia et al. (2012) indicate that
a larger initial loan amount will increase the probability of default. Conversely, some
studies suggest that high-income borrowers with larger initial loans will have lower risk of
default as they have the capability to repay the loan (Yang et al., 1998; Hakim and Haddad,
1999). Thus, this study predicts that ORIBAL will have a positive relationship with the
mortgage loan default.
Loan tenure (LOANTEN) is the tenure of the loan at the time of application. Generally, the
longer the tenure, the higher the probability of default would be due to the possible
contingencies that may arise during the period of validity thereof. Lee and Liu (2002) suggest
that the longer loan tenure will increase the probability of default risk; hence, it is
hypothesized that LOANTEN will have a positive association with the mortgage default.
Loan interest rate (INTRATE) is an interest rate charged by the lender at the time of
application. Lender has the discretion to determine mortgage interest rate charged to
borrowers, where in general, borrowers with good credit rating will be charged lower interest
rates compared to poor credit rating borrowers. Interest rate is the price of the loan that the
borrowers need to pay, where the higher the interest rate, the larger the loan amount would
be. Vandell et al. (1993) and Goodman and Smith (2010) point out that higher interest rates
imply higher debt service payments, which tend to cause default. Thus, it is expected that
INTRATE will have a positive relationship with the mortgage loan default.
Loan-to-value ratio at origination (LTV) is the ratio of a loan initial amount to the value of
the property and inMalaysia, the LTV ratio can reach up to 90%.As a general rule, the higher
the LTV, the higher the risk on the part of the lender, as more money is being lent out to
someonewith less capital to put up front in the first place as a deposit. Studies byHendershott
and Schultz (1993), Springer and Waller (1993), Deng et al. (1996), Hakim and Haddad (1999),
Elul et al. (2010), Quercia et al. (2012), Campbell and Cocco (2015) and Gerardi et al. (2018)
conclude that initial LTV ratio is positively correlated with the mortgage default.
Accordingly, this study hypothesizes that LTV ratio will have a positive association with
the mortgage loan default.
Finally, to control for the effects of lending policy guideline in 2010 [3], economics
condition and geographic and economic variations of states in Malaysia, control variables
such as 2010 lending policy dummy (D2010), 2008–2009 financial crisis dummy (DCRISIS),
borrower’s location dummy (DLOCATION) and property built-up area in square meter
(PROPSIZE) are included. Table 1 provides the detail definition of each variable.
4.3 Logistic regression model
A logistic regressionmodel was used in analyzing the determinants ofmortgage loans default
in Malaysia. A logistic model has the flexibility of incorporating both the qualitative and
quantitative factors and is more efficient than the linear regression probability model.
















δmZmi þ εi (1)
where
Li 5 value of logit
Pi 5mortgage loan default status, which equals 1 for defaulted loans, otherwise equals 0
Xji 5 explanatory variables representing borrower characteristics factors
Wki 5 explanatory variables representing loan characteristics factors
Zmi 5 explanatory variables as control variables
εi 5 error terms
The logistic regression model was estimated using maximum likelihood estimation




Table 2 demonstrates that there is a total of 11% defaulters in the portfolio of the residential
mortgage loan of the respective lending institution, with a total of 5,186 default borrowers.
Table 3 provides the detailed descriptive statistics analysis of the borrower characteristic
factors for default and non-default borrowers. Average age of defaulters is 34 years old
compared to 35 for non-defaulter, approximately 70% of the borrowers are male, andMalays
are the largest borrowers (66.05% for non-default and 59.29% for default borrowers). On
average, 81% of the borrowers are married, and executives are the largest group of
occupation that obtain mortgage loan from this lending institution.
In terms of loan characteristics factors as shown in Table 4, the mean value for PTI ratio
for defaulter is 0.3308 compared to 0.2584 for non-defaulter. This means that on average, the
default borrowers spend 33.08% of their income on housing installment per se, excluding
other fixed expenses such as hire purchase and personal borrowing. Average loan age at the
time the data what collected is 3558.22 days (9.75 years) for default borrower and
3376.29 days (9.25 years) for non-default borrower. On average, half of the loans are secured
with guarantor (53.84% for default and 57.31% for non-default category). The average loan
original balance (initial loan amount) for both category is approximately RM118,000, while
average loan tenure is 324 months (27 years) for default and 309 months (25.8 years) for non-
default loan. Average interest rate approved is 8.5% for default borrower, which is higher
than non-default borrower (7.54%). Average LTV ratio for both category is 89%, and average
property size applying for the housing loan is 116 per square meter for default borrower and
115 per square meter for non-default borrower.
5.2 Results and discussion
The logistic regression model was estimated to determine factors contributing to loan default











estimated model is found to have a good fit with the sample, with a highly significant results
for overall fit test (p-value of almost equal to zero), high values of pseudo R-squared (0.1858)
and high percentage correctly predicted (89.28%). The influences of VIF should at its
minimum (value of VIF ranges from 1.01 to 3.09). There is no evidence of model specification
errors and the robust standard errors (White–Huber standard errors) are employed in the
estimated model. Thus, the estimated model is fit and could be used for interpretations.
For borrower characteristic factors, the results indicate that GENDER, MALAY and
OTHER are positively associated with the mortgage loan default. The positive coefficient of
GENDER with the estimated odds ratio (loan default to no loan default) of 1.2636 indicates
that the odds for men to default is 26.36% higher than the women. The finding is similar to
Lin et al. (2011), Mokhtar et al. (2012) and D’espallier et al. (2011). As highlighted by Kabeer
(2001), men are implicated forwillful defaults andmoral hazardmore thanwomen. This is due
to women are more risk averse (Barsky et al., 1997; Sunden and Surette, 1998; Agnew et al.,
2003; Charness and Gneezy, 2012) and tend to be less selfish and exhibit greater cooperative
Borrower characteristic Variable/item Non-default (41,972) Default (5,186)
Age Age 35 34
Percentage Percentage
Gender Male 70.87 75.56
Female 29.13 24.44
Total 100 100

















Loan characteristics Non-default (41,972) mean Default (5,186) mean
PTI 0.2584 0.3308
Installment amount (RM/Month) 853.11 910.29
Income (RM/month) 3,301 2,752
LOANAGE 3376.29 days 3558.22 days
GUARANTOR 0.5731 0.5384
ORIBAL (RM) 118,577 118,965
LOANTEN (Month) 309 324









Variable Coefficient Odds ratio p-value
Borrower characteristics
AGE 0.0520 0.9493 0.1250
AGE2 0.0007 1.0007 0.1180
GENDER 0.2340 1.2636 0.0000***
MARSTAT 0.0980 1.1030 0.1990
MALAY2A 0.2791 1.3219 0.0160**
INDIAN2A 0.2026 1.2245 0.1350
OTHER2A 0.6197 1.8584 0.0000***
OCCSS2B 0.1724 1.1882 0.2060
OCCMGMT 2B 0.0807 1.0841 0.4970
OCCEXEC2B 0.1168 1.1239 0.1150
OCCNEXEC 2B 0.1594 0.8526 0.2110
OCCSELFEMP 2B 0.1228 0.8844 0.3180
OCCUEMP2B 0.0654 1.0676 0.5510
Loan characteristics
PTI 0.0365 1.0372 0.8110
LOANAGE 0.0019 0.9981 0.0000***
LOANAGE2 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000***
GUARANTOR 0.3421 0.7103 0.0000***
ORIBAL 0.0007 1.0007 0.0000***
LOANTEN 0.0034 1.0034 0.0000***
INTRATE 1.1968 3.3094 0.0000***
LTV 1.2065 3.3418 0.0030***
Other control variables
D2010 1.1752 0.3088 0.0040***
DCRISIS 0.0395 0.9612 0.6550
KEDAH2C 0.6684 1.9511 0.0000***
JOHOR2C 0.3159 1.3714 0.0020***
PENANG2C 0.4662 1.5940 0.0000***
SARAWAK2C 0.9414 2.5636 0.0000***
PERAK2C 0.9593 2.6098 0.0000***
TERENGGANU2C 0.3315 0.7178 0.4090
KELANTAN2C 0.9539 2.5957 0.1150
SABAH2C 0.0696 1.0721 0.7460
PAHANG2C 0.5646 1.7587 0.1440
MELAKA2C 0.2115 1.2355 0.5070
NSEMBILAN2C 0.9947 2.7039 0.0000***
PROPSIZE 0.0352 0.9654 0.7860
CONS 10.3571 0.0000 0.0000***
Note(s):
1. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively
2. 2A. Comparison group: Chinese
2B. Comparison group: OCCGOVT (Government type of occupation)
2C. Comparison group: Selangor state (including Kuala Lumpur)
3. Goodness of fit and robustness tests
a. Overall fit test (Wald chi-squared): significant with p-value of almost zero
b. Pseudo R-squared 5 0.1858; Percentage correctly predicted 5 89.28%
c. VIF (excluded the squared independent variables): mean 5 1.44, minimum 5 1.01, maximum 5 3.09
d. General specification test: no evidence of specification errors (p-value 5 0.491)







behavior driven by a sort of – morality of responsibility (Gilligan, 1982). From a real-world
perspective, this study concludes that male borrowers are usually have higher financial
commitments compared to female borrowers that may affect their ability to repay the
mortgage loans.
As for ethnicity, the positive and significant coefficient of MALAY and OTHER indicates
that Malay and other types of ethnicity (i.e. indigenous groups) have higher tendency to
default compared to Chinese borrowers, which is used as the comparison group. Compared to
the Chinese borrowers, the Malay and other indigenous groups have higher odds (to default)
of 32.19 and 85.84% respectively. As put forward by Loke et al. (2013), Malays are more
susceptible to fall into the credit card debt trap due to the lack of financial savviness. Thus,
this study concludes that Malay and other indigenous groups have lower level of financial
literacy compared to Chinese. This can also be associated with the ethnic economic
involvement where historically, Malays largely engaged in farming, Chinese engaged in
mining and commerce, while ethnic Indians worked on plantations (Thillainathan and
Cheong, 2016). As a result, the Chinese communities are relatively better at financial
knowledge because they are more exposed to business and commerce.
As for the loan characteristic factors, the LOANAGE is found to be significant with
U-shaped relationship as shown by the negative coefficient of LOANAGE and positive
coefficient of LOANAGE2 [4]. This finding is consistent with Campbell and Dietrich (1983),
Quercia and Stegman (1992), Hendershott and Schultz (1993) and Springer andWaller (1993)
where there is exist a non-linear relationship between mortgage age and probability of
default. In terms of the estimated odds ratio, at the initial loan age, the one-day increase in loan
age will decrease the odds to default by 0.19%; whereas at the later stage, the one-day
increase in loan age will increase the odds to default by 0.0000264%. This implies that the
probability of default will be lower at the initial loan age, and then will be likely to increase
after a certain duration. Similar to Green and Furstenberg (1975), the present study concludes
that old loans aremore likely to default as compared to the new loan. This study suggests that
the lending institutions in Malaysia should closely monitor the loan performance in the later
stage of life to lessen the probability of default.
As expected, loan with guarantor is less likely to default as compared to loan without
guarantor, as shown by the negative and significant coefficient of GUARANTOR. The
estimated odds ratio shows that loans with guarantor have 28.97% lower odds of getting
default compared to loanswithout guarantor. This indicates that financial institutions should
ensure the debt-to-service ratio (DSR) of the borrower fall within the accepted value before
approving the housing loan. Otherwise, lenders should request for guarantor if the applicant
does not meet the qualification range.
Other loan characteristic factors that found to be positively and significantly
contributed to the loan default are ORIBAL, LOANTEN, INTRATE and LTV. This
means that higher loan original balance, longer loan tenure, higher loan interest rate and
higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratio will increase the probability of loan default. The finding of
ORIBAL is similar to Kelly (2008), Soyer and Xu (2010), and Quercia et al. (2012) where their
empirical findings show that a larger initial loan amount will increase the probability of
default. Quantitatively, the increase of RM1000 in original balance will increase the odds to
default by 0.07%. As for LOANTEN, the increase of one year in loan tenure will increase
the odds to default by 0.34%.
The finding of INTRATE is parallel with Vandell et al. (1993) and Goodman and Smith
(2010), while the result of LTV is parallel with the findings byHendershott and Schultz (1993),
Springer and Waller (1993), Quigley and Van Order (1995), Deng et al. (1996), Hakim and
Haddad (1999), Deng et al. (2000), Elul et al. (2010), Quercia et al. (2012), Campbell and Cocco
(2015), and Gerardi et al. (2018). Quantitatively, the increase of one unit in interest rate and
loan-to-value ratio will increase the odds by 230.94 and 234.18% respectively [5].
RBF
As for control variables, they are not the focus variables and thus, no interpretations are
provided. Briefly, the 2010 lending policy dummy (D2010), and borrower’s location dummy
(KEDAH, JOHOR, PENANG, SARAWAK, PERAK and NSEMBILAN), are found to be
significant. This indicates that it is important to include the control variables in the regression
analysis.
5.3 Robustness test
One might argue the bias findings of the higher probability of default among male
borrowers because they constitute approximately 70% of the sample. Hence, to gain further
insight, the logistic regression model was re-estimated by gender, enabling this study to
identify the sources of the gender differential effect in terms of the probability of loan
default. Table 6 presents the estimated models in which the first model is the estimated
model using male sample; and the second uses female sample. The odds ratio was used
since the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of logit model is not directly interpretable.
The last column of Table 6 shows the differences of the estimate odds ratio between male
and female model. Since the insignificant variable has odds ratio that not significant
different from one, i.e. the variable is not able to give an impact on the probability of loan
default, thus the insignificant variables are ignored. Only the estimated odds ratio of the
significant variables is compared.
Table 6 indicates that, male fromMalay ethnicity is more likely to default (0.3585, in odds
ratio) than the female Malay. Similar to other ethnicity, the male is more likely to default,
however with substantially lower differences (0.1572). There are more significant variables in
the loan characteristic factors. Compared to male, female has slightly lower negative impact
(to loan default) of loan age (0.0026), and substantially lower for availability of guarantor
(0.2078); whereas, female has slightly lower positive impact (to loan default) of original loan
balance (0.0006), substantially lower for loan-to-value (LTV) ratio (1.7230), and moderately
lower for loan interest rate (0.1410).
6. Conclusion and policy implications
This study aims to investigate factors contributing to mortgage loan default in Malaysia by
analyzing 47,158 housing loan borrowers’ data using the logistic regression analysis. The
findings conclude that gender, ethnicity, guarantor availability, loan original balance, loan
tenure, loan interest rate and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio are the significant factors that
influencemortgage loans default inMalaysia. The results offer important implications for the
housing finance policy in Malaysia.
It is suggested that a simple test on the basic money management skills can be executed
during the loan evaluation process as a way to reduce the probability of mortgage loan
default. Moreover, since women are more responsible in their loan repayment, Malaysian
lenders may create a newmortgage loan product specifically for female borrowers, following
the strategy of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, that targets more women in its loan allocation,
as 97% of its borrowers are women. Although this potentially triggers criticism of gender
discrimination, the efforts of Grameen Bank, have however, received various awards and
recognition worldwide. Among the awards is the MCCI Award – for their pioneering role in
poverty alleviation and social development in Bangladesh.
Lenders may also request for guarantor if the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio beyond the
accepted value. In addition, lower interest rate can be charged to the low-income borrowers so
that they can service the loan as the greater financial burden associated with high loan cost
will lead to a higher loan commitment which will increase the risk of loan default. To further
reduce the probability of default, the loan tenure can be shortened from 35 years to 30 years.





borrowers to purchase their second home to minimize loan default as currently, the LTV is
capped at 70% to buy third home and the rule does not apply to purchase first and
second homes.
Future studies may expand the sample by employing data from other types of financial
institutions that would give greater insights as findings might vary due to differences in
objectives, functions and regulations. In addition, the findings are subjected to the censoring
bias [6], where the no default borrowers are incomplete spells that censored on 31 October
2016 (date of obtaining the data). Once a panel data is available, future studies could perform




DifferencesOdds ratio p-value Odds ratio p-value
Borrower characteristics (1) (2) (1)-(2)
AGE 0.9224 0.2110 0.9590 0.3030 0.0366
AGE2 1.0010 0.2590 1.0006 0.2660 0.0004
MARSTAT 1.0497 0.7050 1.1350 0.1930 0.0854
MALAY 1.5968 0.0530 1.2383 0.1170 0.3585*
INDIAN 1.5559 0.1180 1.1283 0.4430 0.4277
OTHER 1.9839 0.0190 1.8268 0.0000 0.1572*
OCCSS 1.1326 0.6400 1.2300 0.1740 0.0974
OCCMGMT 1.1517 0.5290 1.0426 0.7700 0.1091
OCCEXEC 1.1401 0.3400 1.1294 0.1740 0.0107
OCCNEXEC 0.8567 0.5360 0.8448 0.2540 0.0119
OCCSELFEMP 0.8561 0.5400 0.8960 0.4450 0.0399
OCCUNEMP 1.0205 0.9370 1.0772 0.5480 0.0567
Loan characteristics
PTI 0.9388 0.8100 1.0401 0.8340 0.1013
LOANAGE 0.9962 0.0000 0.9988 0.0270 0.0026*
LOANAGE2 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0360 0.0000*
GUARANTOR 0.8699 0.2770 0.6621 0.0000 0.2078*
ORIBAL 1.0012 0.0200 1.0006 0.0000 0.0006*
LOANTEN 1.0029 0.0040 1.0037 0.0000 0.0008*
INTRATE 3.4161 0.0000 3.2751 0.0000 0.1410*
LTV 4.6245 0.0620 2.9015 0.0270 1.7230*
PROPSIZE 0.9401 0.8580 0.9593 0.8390 0.0192
Other control variables
D2010 0.0561 0.0000 0.5494 0.1140 0.4933*
DCRISIS 0.8596 0.3410 1.0279 0.7870 0.1683
KEDAH 2.0802 0.0000 1.9127 0.0000 0.1675*
JOHOR 1.1980 0.4190 1.4068 0.0030 0.2088*
PENANG 1.8537 0.0020 1.5144 0.0010 0.3393*
SARAWAK 4.4145 0.0000 2.0034 0.0010 2.4112*
PERAK 3.6327 0.0040 2.3392 0.0020 1.2935*
TERENGGANU 0.3275 0.2890 0.9231 0.8710 0.5956
KELANTAN 5.2456 0.0560 1.6312 0.5430 3.6144*
SABAH 0.6913 0.3880 1.3352 0.2640 0.6439
PAHANG 1.0795 0.9220 2.0847 0.0500 1.0052*
MELAKA 2.5830 0.0960 0.9632 0.9240 1.6198*
NSEMBILAN 1.6444 0.3060 3.0752 0.0000 1.4308*
Cons 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007






1. Source: Bank Negara Malaysia Financial Stability Review–Second Half 2019 available at https://
www.bnm.gov.my/ar2019/files/fsr2019h2_en_full.pdf. 2015 was the highest level of household
indebtedness, reaching 89% of GDP.
2. Malaysia is a multi-racial country, with three major ethnic groups: Malay, Chinese, and Indian
besides other ethnic groups in Sabah and Sarawak, called indigenous races. Malays and
indigenous races are also known as “Bumiputra” forming the largest ethnic group in Malaysia.
The ethnicity of indigenous group includes Eurasian, Iban, Kadazan, Punan and other Bumiputra
in Malaysia.
3. In 2010, the Central Bank of Malaysia implemented a set of pre-emptive measures aimed at
containing excessive household indebtedness and to reinforce responsible lending practices by loan
providers.
4. The one-unit increases in interest rate refers to 1% point increase –which is huge as the interest rate
ranges from 2% to 9.5% only. Thus, this leads to huge effect to the odds of default to no-default.
Similar to the loan-to-value ratio that ranges from 0.5 to 1.
5. LOANAGE2 was added in the regression analysis to test whether nonlinear relationship exists
between the mortgage age and loan default. We interpret the coefficient of LOANAGE2 as positive
because the actual coefficient is 0.000000264 with the odds ratio of 1.000000264. The small value of
coefficient is due to loan age was measured in number of days with the assumption of 365 days a
year. For the power of two, the one-unit measurement of LOANAGE2 refers to 133,225 days and this
explains why the coefficient value is too small.
6. Thank you to the anonymous referee who has pointed out this potential censoring bias.
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